The Generalized Extreme Value Model was developed by McFadden for the case with discrete choice sets. The present paper extends this model to cases with both discrete and continuous choice sets and choice sets that are unobservable relative to the analyst. We also propose behavioral assumptions that justify random utility functions (processes) that have a max stable structure i.e., utility processes where the finite dimensional distributions are of the multivariate extreme value type.
We extend this result in the sense that when utility is viewed as a stochastic process with the consumption bundle as parameter, our version of IIA is shown to imply that the utility process is max-stable. This means that the joint distribution of a vector of utilities, evaluated at different consumption bundles, is of the multivariate extreme value type. Once this has been established it is possible to draw on recent developments in probability theory (cf. de Haan, (1984)) to characterize the corresponding probability model for the agent's choices.
A random formulation of the utility function is usually motivated by the econometrician's need to account for unobservable tasteshifters that are assumed to be perfectly foreseeable to the agent. However, in the field of psychology, beginning with 3 that is consistent with a continuous version of the Luce model, and finally, in Section 5 we briefly consider the case where the alternatives are discrete.
THE CHOICE SETTING AND MAX-STABLE UTILITY PROCESSES
In this paper, except Section 5, it is assumed that each choice alternative is identified by a pair, ( where 3 is a countable, unobservable (to the econometrician), and agent-specific set, and D is an observable set. 8* is the Borel field associated with Y. The set D is introduced in addition to 3, to allow the analyst to take into account both unobservable and observable restrictions on the set of feasible attributes. This may be desirable in some applications. Since is countable it can be mitten as an enumeration, S=a(z), ze Z), where Z is the set of integers. Since Z is agent specific, this enumeration is agent specific. Thus, agents are allowed to be heterogeneous with respect to feasible attributes (opportunities). However, for notational simplicity, the agent's index is suppressed. where p e ikm , is a vector of prices and f(T(z)) is the agent's income net of fixed cost associated with attribute vector T(z).
For example, when we consider the joint choice of geographical location and consumption, x is a vector of goods and T(z) may be the coordinates of location z and f(T(z)) the income minus the fixed cost associated with choosing location z.
In general, the prices may also be attribute specific. We shall, however, not include this case in the general analysis. We demonstrate in examples below how the analysis can be modified to account for prices that depend on attributes.
The agent's preferences are represented by a utility function U(x, z) = u(x,T(z), E(z)) where, as above, z indexes the attributes. Here u •) is a (deterministic) function, u:Rm .i .xYxR-->R, that may depend on observable characteristics of the agent, and E(z) is a tasteshifter associated with attribute vector T(z). The tasteshifters are also agent-specific so that if two different agents have a particular T(z) in their choice sets the corresponding tasteshifters are not necessarily equal. These tasteshifters account for unobserved heterogeneity in tastes across agents and across different attributes for a given agent.
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As mentioned above, psychologists interpret the tasteshifters as random relative to the agent in the sense that his preferences for a specific attribute vary from one moment to the next in an unpredictable manner due to instability in the agent's wims, moods and perceptions.
The agent's objective is to maximize utility subject to (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3). Let x*(p, C) and T*(p, C) denote the value of x and the attribute that maximize utility, respectively, where C=KxD. In general, since there is no guaranty that this utility maximization problem yields a unique solution, (x*(p, C),T*(p, C)), we need to impose restrictions on the utility function and the choice set C. The structure of the utility function will be characterized on the basis of a set of assumptions which we shall introduce below.
ASSUIVIIMON 1: The function u(.) has the structure u(x, t, e) = v(x, t) + e, where v:
R7xY-->1? is jointly measurable. We can now prove the following result. A proof of Theorem 2 is given in the appendix. demonstrated that P(Nc>n) ---) 0 when n -4 oo. Therefore, since P(N,=00) P(N c>n) for any finite n we can conclude that N, is finite with probability one.
Let V(p, K) = sup sup (v(x,T(z)) +E(z)). (T(z),E(z))e H,ze Z,pix 5 f(T(z)),xe K The interpretation of V(p, K) is as the constrained indirect utility (constrained to K). Since the number of Poisson points in H is a.s. finite and (T(z), E(z)) does not depend on x we get (2.10) V(p,K) = sup (i)(p,T(z),K) +E(z)). (T(z),E(z))e H,ze Z The interpretation of it r(p,T(z), K) + E(z) is as the constrained conditional indirect
utility given attribute z.
AssummoN 7: For fixed te Y, x--)v(x, t) is strictly quasi-concave and increasing in X except possibly for t element of a set of G measure zero. The unconstrained conditional indirect utility, t, also has the standard indirect utility properties.
CHOICE PROBABILMES
We are now ready to study the properties of the probability distribution of x*(p,C) and In particular, the conditional density of the unobservable T*2 given 11 is equal to (3.14) The proof of (5.7) is completely analogous to the proof of (3.3).
'T*(p,C). Recall that C = KxD represents the observable choice constraints. Let A = (XE K,T(z)€.5nD: (x,T(z)) maximizes utility s.t. the budget constraint (2.3)). Thus
As in the continuous case we realize that the choice probability (5.7) will not in general satisfy 11A. A sufficient condition for IIA to hold is that the spectral functions have disjoint supports because then the utilities become independent, cf. de Haan (1984) . However, this condition is not necessary. Strauss (1979) has demonstrated that it is possible to specify GEV models with interdependent utility functions that satisfy HA. 
